1. allow domain process can use fd 2. allow domain process can write data to file in /data/vendor/aee_exp/ MTK-Commit-Id: 7b021c62aa51a474e12c59a805f97b27b940e357 Change-Id: I286e248c8fd3fe05492753a91806c19ffce0079d CR-Id: ALPS04864227 Feature: Android Exception Engine(AEE)
33 lines
1.3 KiB
Plaintext
33 lines
1.3 KiB
Plaintext
# ==============================================
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# MTK Policy Rule
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# ==============================================
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# Grant read access to mtk core property type which represents all
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# mtk properties except those with ctl_xxx prefix.
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# Align Google change: f01453ad453b29dd723838984ea03978167491e5
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get_prop(domain, mtk_core_property_type)
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# Allow all processes to search /sys/kernel/debug/binder/ since it's has been
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# labeled with specific debugfs label and many violations to dir search debugfs_binder
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# are observed. Grant domain to suppress the violations as originally "debugfs:dir search"
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# is also allowed to domain as well in Google default domain.te
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allow domain debugfs_binder:dir search;
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# Allow all processes to read /sys/bus/platform/drivers/dev_info/dev_info
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# as it is a public interface for all processes to read some OTP data.
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allow {
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domain
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-isolated_app
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} sysfs_devinfo:file r_file_perms;
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# Date:20170630
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# Purpose: allow trusted process to connect aee daemon
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#allow {
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# coredomain
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# -untrusted_app_all
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#} aee_aed:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow { domain -coredomain -hal_configstore_server -vendor_init } aee_aedv:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow { domain -coredomain -hal_configstore_server -vendor_init } aee_exp_vendor_file:file w_file_perms;
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allow { domain -coredomain -hal_configstore_server -vendor_init } aee_aedv:fd use;
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